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Social Polarisation or 
Professionalisation?  






The debate over whether or not the de-industrialisation of cities is accompanied 
by the occupational and income polarisation of their working populations has 
been characterised by some confusion over the relationship between incomes 
and occupations in the service sector. Specifically, many scholars have 
misunderstood the significance of middle-income service sector occupations for 
their interpretations of the post-industrial class structure of cities. Through a 
comparative study of de-industrialisation in Cape Town, we present evidence to 
show that the growth of service sector employment can, under specific 
conditions, produce a large middle-income occupational class of clerks, sales 
and personal services workers. The growth of this class can offset the decline of 
middle-income jobs caused by the loss of artisans, operatives and drivers in the 
declining manufacturing sector. 
 
 
De-industrialisation and the urban class 
structure 
 
The changing patterns in the occupational class structure of cities are 
increasingly being understood, at least in part, in terms of the de-
industrialisation of urban economies. Specifically, de-industrialisation has 
changed the sectoral composition of employment, through the absolute decline 
of manufacturing jobs and the simultaneous absolute growth in service sector 
employment. There is general agreement among scholars that this shift in the 
sectoral composition of employment has resulted in the relative and absolute 
increase in the numbers of managerial and professional jobs. There is less 
agreement, however, on the impact of de-industrialisation on the growth of 
unskilled jobs. Some authors have argued that de-industrialisation also leads to 
the absolute growth in the number of unskilled jobs, contributing to the 
‘polarisation’ of the occupational and income structure (Chiu and Lui, 2004; 
Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1994; Sassen, 1998; Soja, 1991). Others 
have argued that de-industrialisation has not led to the absolute growth of 
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unskilled jobs, with the result that the occupational structure has become 
‘professionalised’ (Hamnett, 1994a; 1994b; 2003). 
 
According to the social polarisation hypothesis, because the service sector is 
more polarised than the manufacturing sector, the growth of service sector 
employment leads to occupational and income polarisation. This means that the 
service sector jobs tend to be predominantly high-skill and high-income, on the 
one hand, or low-skill and low-income, on the other (Sassen, 2001: 9). By 
contrast, the manufacturing sector is characterised largely by semi-skilled and 
middle-income jobs. Testing the social polarisation thesis therefore depends on 
how one defines these levels of skill and income and their associated 
occupations. If the social polarisation thesis is to be accepted, low-skill, low-
income service sector jobs must necessarily require less skill and provide lower 
remuneration than blue-collar manufacturing jobs. Correspondingly, high-skill, 
high-income service sector jobs must require more skill and provide higher 
remuneration than blue-collar manufacturing sector jobs. 
 
There is general agreement among scholars about which types of jobs are 
considered to be highly-skilled and highly-paid. Cities where services have 
grown have experienced burgeoning numbers of highly-skilled, well-paid 
managers and professionals such as bankers, stockbrokers, securities analysts, 
corporate lawyers and advertising executives (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004; 
Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). Even in the manufacturing sector, the numbers of 
scientists, mathematicians, engineers, computer specialists, and weapons experts 
have grown in cities where high-technology industries have become the major 
economic sector (Soja, 1991). Greater use of computer-operated machine tools 
has also resulted in the need for highly skilled technicians, such as ‘designers’ 
and ‘engineers’ (Wilson, 1996). 
 
There is less agreement, however, on the definition of low-skilled, low-income 
jobs. Some scholars have classified certain associate professional and clerical 
jobs as low-income, low-skill jobs. Wilson uses the occupations of ‘practical 
nursing’ and ‘clerical work’ as examples of service sector jobs which are held 
by ‘less-educated’ women, thereby implying that these are low-skill, low-
income occupations (Wilson, 1996:27). Similarly, in describing low-paid jobs in 
the service sector, Sassen groups the clerical jobs of ‘secretaries’ and ‘stock 
clerks’ with the unskilled manual job of ‘cleaner’ (Sassen, 1994: 105). Sassen 
also explicitly divides service sector occupations into only two groups: ‘non-
professionalised occupations’, which she calls ‘low-skilled’ and 
‘professionalised occupations’, which she calls ‘high-skilled’ (Sassen, 2001: 
228). In effect, these authors classify all non-managerial and non-professional 
service sector jobs as low-income, low-skilled jobs. Service sector occupations 
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are therefore divided into two groups: high-skilled, high-income professionals 
and managers, on the one hand, and low-skill, low-income workers on the other. 
By contrast, skilled (artisanal) and semi-skilled (operative) manual jobs in the 
manufacturing sector are considered to be middle-income jobs. This 
conceptualisation means that employment growth in service sector jobs at the 
expense of manufacturing jobs leads, by definition, to the polarisation of the 
occupational structure. 
 
The flaw in the above classification lies in the assumption that there are no 
middle-income service sector workers who earn incomes similar to semi-skilled, 
blue-collar manufacturing workers. To adequately test the social polarisation 
thesis, we must distinguish between those non-managerial and non-professional 
service sector jobs that are less-skilled and lower-paid than the blue-collar, 
middle-income jobs of the manufacturing sector and those that are not. Only 
then can we test the social polarisation hypothesis by examining data for the 
growth in low-income, low-skill service sector jobs. 
 
Following Hamnett’s (1994a: 405) reasoning, we could accept the social 
polarisation hypothesis only if the results showed employment growth in high-
income and low-income jobs, and employment decline in middle-income jobs. 
This is effectively what Baum tries to do in his study of Sydney’s changing 
occupational structure (Baum, 1997: 1885-7). He identifies ‘sales and personal 
services workers’ as the occupational class with the lowest income and shows 
that employment in this class has grown in absolute terms. He also shows that 
there was absolute employment growth in the high-income occupations of 
‘managers and administration’, ‘professionals’ and ‘para-professionals’. He 
contrasts this pattern of employment growth with the absolute decline in 
employment among the middle-income, manufacturing jobs of ‘trades persons’ 
and ‘plant and machine operators and drivers’. Although Baum points out that 
his results show the increasing numerical importance of professional and 
managerial jobs, he nonetheless interprets this pattern of employment change as 
‘leading to a polarising occupational structure’ (Baum, 1997: 1887). 
 
At face value, this interpretation makes sense. However, a closer examination of 
the income differences between these occupational groups raises questions about 
which of them should be classified as low-income. If one compares the income 
distributions of the occupational groups that Baum classifies as middle and low-
income groups, what stands out is just how similar they are (Baum, 1997: 1892). 
Specifically, the vast majority (74 to 89 percent) of all workers in these 
occupational groups earned incomes between AUD 5,001 and AUD 35,000. 
This makes it rather difficult to distinguish low-income service sector 
occupations from middle-income manufacturing occupations. Although Baum 
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argues that ‘sales and personal services workers’ are low-income workers, the 
evidence shows that they earn only marginally less than workers employed in 
the typically blue-collar manufacturing occupations of ‘trades persons’ and 
‘plant and machine operators and drivers’. The differences are so small that the 
method of comparing incomes produces different results. For example, if we 
compare the percentage of workers who earned less than AUD 25,001 in 1991, 
we can establish income differences between ‘sales and personal services 
workers’ and blue-collar manufacturing workers. The percentage of ‘sales and 
personal services workers’ who fall into this category is 70.7 percent, compared 
to 54.6 percent for ‘trades persons’ and 64.1 percent for ‘plant and machine 
operators and drivers’ (Table 1). However, if we use a different measurement, 
say the percentage of workers who earn less than AUD 35,001, then no such 
differences can be found. Specifically, 87.3 percent of ‘sales and personal 
services workers’ earned less than AUD 35,001 in 1991. This measurement of 
income difference places ‘sales and personal services workers’ slightly below 
‘trades persons’, of which 86.9 percent earned less than AUD 35,001, and 
slightly above ‘plant and machine operators and drivers’, of which 88.0 percent 
earned less than AUD 35,001 (Table 1). 
 


















administrators 24.2 44.8 43.6 75.8
Professionals 24.7 50.7 48.1 75.3
Para-professionals 32.4 70.9 69.5 67.8
Clerks 64.1 91.2 87.8 35.9
Sales and personal service 
workers 70.7 87.3 74.3 29.3
Trades persons 54.6 86.9 85.3 45.4
Plant and machine 
operators and drivers 64.1 88.0 86.6 35.9
Labourers and related 
workers 82.1 95.1 88.5 17.9
Source: Baum (1997: 1892) 
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Accurately distinguishing between low-income and middle-income occupational 
classes has important implications for how we interpret the changing class 
structure of cities. For example, by classifying ‘labourers and related workers’ 
as low to middle-income earners, Baum is able to interpret the decline of this 
occupational group as support for the social polarisation thesis. In other words, 
he argues that the absolute decline in the employment of middle-income 
workers, such as ‘labourers and related workers’ supports the social polarisation 
thesis (Baum, 1997: 1891). However, if ‘labourers and related workers’ are 
classified as low-income workers, then the absolute decline in employment of 
this unskilled occupational class undermines the social polarisation hypothesis 
and lends support for the professionalisation hypothesis. 
 
A similar kind of interpretation is made by Chiu and Lui (2004: 1871) in their 
study of Hong Kong. They argue that social polarisation is taking place because 
of the absolute employment growth in managerial and professional occupations, 
on the one hand, and the growth in ‘service workers and shop sales workers’ and 
‘elementary [unskilled] occupations’, on the other hand. They make this claim 
on the basis that the median incomes of these two occupational groups were less 
than those of both the ‘craft and related workers’ and ‘plant and machine 
operators and assemblers’. However, this argument exaggerates the trend 
towards occupational polarisation by grouping ‘service workers and shop sales 
workers’ along with ‘elementary’ workers. The median monthly income of 
‘service workers and shop sales workers’ is in fact comparable to that of ‘craft 
and related workers’ and ‘plant and machine operators and assemblers’ and is 
much higher than that of ‘elementary’ workers. In 2001, ‘service workers and 
shop sales workers’ earned a median monthly income of HK$ 9,110, which was 
only marginally less than the HK$ 10,000 earned by both ‘craft and related 
workers’ and ‘plant and machine operators and assemblers’. By contrast, 
‘elementary’ workers earned a median monthly income of only HK$ 5,300, 
which is about half that of middle-income workers (Chiu and Lui, 2004: 1871). 
 
This classification of ‘service workers and shop sales workers’ as low-income 
workers instead of middle-income workers is not a trivial matter. It has 
important consequences for how we interpret changes in the occupational class 
structure. If service workers and shop and sales workers are treated, along with 
clerks, as middle-income workers instead of low-income workers, then many de-
industrialising cities may have experienced employment growth in middle-
income service jobs. Such growth may even be high enough to offset the loss of 
middle-income manufacturing jobs. For example, from 1991 to 2001, Hong 
Kong lost 204,152 blue-collar manufacturing jobs but gained 227,983 clerical 
and sales jobs (Chiu and Lui, 2004: 1870). This requires a whole new 
interpretation of changes in the occupational class structure of Hong Kong. It is 
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no longer possible to claim that the occupational structure is unambiguously 
polarising. Instead, one would have to admit that there was no decline in the 
numbers of middle-income jobs, which is one of the claims of the social 
polarisation thesis. One would also have to admit that employment growth in 
managerial, professional and associate professional jobs was four times as great 
as the growth in unskilled elementary jobs. Although this is certainly a 
polarising pattern of growth, it is nonetheless a pattern that is biased towards the 
growth of high-skill, high-income jobs. 
 
 
De-Industrialisation in Cape Town 
 
The debate over social polarisation has most prominently taken the form of a 
discussion of inequality in world cities, where the decline of manufacturing 
employment and the growth in service sector employment has been most 
pronounced. However, deindustrialization has characterized many cities all over 
the world. This same process of a shift from manufacturing to services has 
occurred in other cities that do not play a leading role in the global economy as 
do the more commonly accepted world cities such as London, New York, Los 
Angeles and Tokyo (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 1999; Taylor, 2000). Many 
scholars have therefore used the polarisation debate as a framework in which to 
examine economic restructuring and its impacts on the labour markets of a range 
of cities throughout the world. This approach has been used in studies of Beijing 
(Gu and Liu, 2002) and Johannesburg (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; 
Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004), which arguably play a smaller role in the 
globalising economy than cities like London and New York. Rio de Janeiro, 
which does not even fit the profile of the traditional post-industrial city with a 
manufacturing-based economy, and which shows even fewer signs of world city 
status than Johannesburg or Beijing, has also been scrutinized from the 
perspective of the polarisation hypothesis (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000). Miami is 
yet another city that did not have the traditional industrial base of a post-
industrial city, but to which the theories of the polarisation debate have been 
applied (Nijman, 1996). So, while Cape Town has shown only minimal evidence 
of becoming a world city (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 1999; Taylor, 2000) 
it has nonetheless undergone substantial de-industrialisation with important 
consequences for the occupational class structure of its working population. 
 
Although Cape Town was South Africa’s major administrative, cultural and 
service centre in the 1920’s, manufacturing began to play a significant role in its 
economy from the First World War, especially in the clothing, textile, paper and 
printing, food, beverages, and light engineering sectors (Wilkinson, 2000). Later 
on, the manufacturing sector was given a boost by the protection afforded it by 
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the Second World War’s artificial import barriers (Cole, 1984; van der Horst, 
1964). The manufacturing sector continued to grow, so much so that by 1960 it 
contributed the largest share to Cape Town’s GGP (Dewar, Watson and Howes, 
1990). Looking at population census data, it can be seen that between 1946 and 
1980, the manufacturing sector provided a sizeable share of all employment in 
the city of between 25 and 28 percent (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage distribution of employment by main economic 
sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
 
Main Economic 
Sector 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 1996 2001
Community, social & 
personal services 31 31 25 29 29 30 30 29
Wholesale & retail 
trade, catering & 
accommodation 
services 
18 16 17 16 16 19 17 20
Manufacturing 25 27 28 28 26 22 22 18
Finance, insurance, real 
estate & business 
services 
4 5 6 7 7 10 13 15
Construction 7 8 11 8 10 8 8 8
Transport, storage & 
communication 13 9 9 8 7 7 7 6
Others 3 6 4 3 4 2 3 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 3. Frequency distribution of employment by main economic sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001 
 
Main Economic Sector 1946 1960 1970 1980 1985 1991 1996 2001 
Community, social & personal 
services 53,946 94,843 114,039 170,646 186,781 236,886 235,736 237,708 
Wholesale & retail trade, catering & 
accommodation services 32,187 50,605 78,068 93,038 106,886 151,273 134,713 166,481 
Manufacturing 43,720 82,199 129,082 163,658 172,292 170,133 169,312 147,488 
Finance, insurance, real estate & 
business services 6,429 14,734 28,170 41,636 48,438 75,626 105,113 125,192 
Construction 12,066 23,697 52,025 47,530 65,816 65,570 65,853 66,772 
Transport, storage & 
communication 22,702 26,501 39,915 47,848 46,181 56,647 51,880 49,793 
Others 4,646 17,100 17,380 15,572 26,392 17,802 24,757 28,016 
Total 175,696 309,678 458,679 588,879 652,786 783,429 787,364 821,450 
Source: Authors’ analysis of South African population census results.1 
 
                                                 
1 These population census data are for the area bounded by the Magisterial Districts of Bellville, Cape, Goodwood, Kuilsriver, Mitchell’s Plain, 
Simonstown, Somerset West, Strand and Wynberg. The data were compiled from published reports (Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1955; 
Bureau of Statistics, 1968; Central Statistical Services, 1985, 1986 and 1992; Department of Statistics, 1976) and from tables created using the 
Census 1996 and Census 2001 Community Profiles Databases supplied by Statistics South Africa. For all these censuses, the figures in the 
‘unknown’ category were excluded from the analysis. The reason for this was that this category could not always be distinguished from the 
‘unemployed’ category. 
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However, employment growth in manufacturing began to flag after 1970.  Until 
1970, the average annual employment growth rate was 4.6 percent. However, 
from 1970 to 1980 the annual rate of manufacturing employment growth slowed 
to 2.4 percent and from 1980 to 1985 it fell even further to 1.0 percent. By 1983, 
only 23 percent of the city’s GGP came from manufacturing (Dewar, Watson 
and Howes, 1990). 
 
After 1985, the employment growth trend in manufacturing was reversed 
(Table 2 and Figure 1). Between 1985 and 2001, the sector shed 24,804 jobs, 
and the average growth rate of manufacturing employment was –1.0 percent per 
annum. While certain manufacturing sub-sectors experienced above-average 
output growth from 1996 to 2000, (e.g. beverages and tobacco, wood and 
furniture, paper, printing and publishing, rubber and plastics, electronic and 
electrical, and transport equipment), major industries such as food, textiles, 
clothing, chemicals and petroleum performed badly, thereby lowering the 
overall growth of the manufacturing sector considerably (Economic and Social 
Development Directorate, 2001). Although the heavy steel industries of metal, 
steel and machinery, grew strongly from 1996 to 1998, their output also declined 
between 1998 and 2000.  Therefore, despite growth in real output in Cape 
Town’s overall economy between 1980 and 2000, employment growth slowed.  
Whereas 1 percent growth in output implied 1 percent growth in employment in 
1980, a 1 percent increase in output in the 1990’s resulted in only a 0.7 percent 
increase in employment on average.  This can be attributed to capital 
intensification in most sectors (including manufacturing) as a result of factors 
such as technological advances in production techniques as well as factors that 
altered the real and potential cost ratio between capital and labour, such as 
labour legislation and trade union pressure for higher wages (Economic and 
Social Development Directorate, 2001). In addition to this, the exposure to 
international competition in the 1990’s, which resulted in the closure of 
factories, especially in clothing and textiles, also led to fewer jobs being 
available in Cape Town’s formal economy than there otherwise would have 
been (Wilkinson, 2000). 
 
In contrast to the manufacturing sector, employment in the service industry 
continued to grow in the period 1985-2001 (Table 3 and Figure 1). Cape Town 
has always been an important administrative, cultural and service centre. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the ‘community, social and personal services’ sector 
(hereafter ‘social and personal services’) provided about the same number of 
jobs as did manufacturing from 1946 to 1980. However, employment trends in 
these two sectors diverged after 1980. Between 1985 and 2001, the period in 
which the manufacturing sector shed jobs, the ‘social and personal services’ 
sector gained 50,927 workers. Employment in the ‘social and personal services’ 
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sector continued to grow at an average annual rate of 1.5 percent between 1985 
and 2001.  Thus, while manufacturing and ‘social and personal services’ both 
accounted for about 28 percent of employment in 1980, manufacturing’s relative 
employment share had dropped to 18 percent by 2001 while the ‘social and 
personal services’ sector still accounted for 29 percent of employment in Cape 
Town. 
 
The ‘wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation services’ sector 
(hereafter referred to as ‘commerce’) and ‘finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services’ (FIRE) sectors also experienced steady employment growth 
since 1946; so much so, that commerce provided more jobs than manufacturing 
in 2001 (Table 3 and Figure 1).  While employment growth in manufacturing 
stagnated and declined between 1980 and 2001, commerce and FIRE gained 
73,443 and 83,556 employees respectively.  These gains represent an annual 
average growth rate of 2.8 percent in commerce and 5.4 percent in FIRE for that 
period.  Though historically providing fewer jobs, commerce overtook 
manufacturing in 2001, contributing 166,481 jobs to Cape Town’s economy 





Figure 1. Employment by selected economic sector, Cape Town, 1946-2001. Source: Authors’ analysis of 
population census results. 
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The sector that experienced the most rapid employment growth was the FIRE 
sector. The annual average employment growth rate of this sector from 1946 to 
2001 was 5.5 percent. This was about twice the average annual growth rate in 
social and personal services (2.7 percent) and in commerce (3.0 percent) over 
the same period. FIRE was also the only sector besides commerce to actually 
increase its relative share of employment. While FIRE contributed only 4 
percent to the total number of jobs in 1946, this proportion had increased to 15 
percent by 2001 (Table 2). 
 
 
The effects of sectoral change on the 
occupational structure 
 
In order to examine the effect of de-industrialisation on the occupational 
structure of employment, we have compared the population census data for 1980 
and 2001.2 This choice is based on the fact that 1980 was the census year in 
which manufacturing and service sector employment began to diverge 
(Figure 1). From this point on, the rate of employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector began to slow down and, from 1985, employment declined 
in absolute terms. By contrast, employment in all service sectors continued to 
grow from 1980. 
 
The results of this comparison of the occupational structures of employment in 
1980 and 2001 show that there was absolute and relative growth in all 
occupations except for the middle-income manufacturing occupational classes of 
‘craft and related trades workers’ and ‘plant and machinery operators and 
assemblers’ (Table 4). Employment in these typical blue-collar manufacturing 
occupational groups declined in absolute and relative terms. Specifically, the 
numbers of employed craft and related trades workers declined by 7,611 and 
plant and machine operators and assemblers fell by 13,054 (Table 4). By 
contrast, managerial jobs increased by 37,418, professional jobs by 34,931 and 
associate professional and technical jobs by 62,894. Employment in elementary 
(unskilled) jobs increased by 66,114. Employment in clerical jobs also rose by 
30,810 and the employment of service workers and shop and sales workers 
increased by 44,066 (Table 4). 
 
In the strictest sense, these results can be interpreted as evidence for social 
polarisation. After all, following Hamnett’s line of reasoning (Hamnett, 1994a) 
there was an absolute employment increase in highly-paid, managerial and 
professional occupations, on the one hand, and an absolute employment increase 
in unskilled and low-income occupations on the other. Simultaneously, there 
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was an absolute decline in the middle-income blue-collar jobs of the 
manufacturing sector. On the face of it, these results appear to provide support 
for the social polarisation hypothesis. However, on closer examination, the 
interpretation of these results is less straightforward than it would first appear. 
 
Firstly, any interpretation of these occupational changes must not ignore the 
growth of employment in the occupational groups of ‘clerks’ and ‘service 
workers and shop and market sales workers’. We argue that these occupational 
groups comprise mostly middle-income occupations and not low-income 
occupations. As such, employment growth in these occupations does not 
contribute towards occupational polarisation. According to the population 
census of 2001, ‘clerks’ and ‘service workers and shop and market sales 
workers’ earned slightly more than blue-collar manufacturing workers. Most 
blue-collar manufacturing occupations, namely ‘craft and related trades workers’ 
(65 percent) and ‘plant and machinery operators and assemblers’ (75 percent) 
earned from R801 to R3,200 per month (Table 5). The incomes of most ‘service 
workers, shop and market sales workers’ (57 percent) fell in the same income 
categories. Similarly, most ‘clerks’ (66 percent) earned in a slightly higher, but 
overlapping, income category of R1,601 to R6,400 (Table 1). As far as average 
earnings were concerned, ‘craft and related trades workers’ earned R3,061 per 
month  and ‘plant and machinery operators and assemblers’ earned R2,413 per 
month. The monthly earnings of ‘clerks’ and ‘service workers, shop and market 
sales workers’ was slightly higher, at R4,255 and R4,403, respectively (Table 5). 
 
Even the lowest-paid workers in the ‘service workers, shop and market sales 
workers’ group, namely ‘housekeeping and restaurant service workers’, still 
earn more than unskilled ‘elementary workers’. Specifically, ‘housekeeping and 
restaurant service workers’, earned an average monthly income of R2,233, 
which is substantially higher than the R1,488 earned by elementary workers and 
only marginally less than the R2,413 earned by plant and machine operators and 
assemblers. 
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Table 4. Changes in the occupational distribution of the working population, Cape Town, 1980 and 2001 
 
















Managers, legislators & senior 
officials 27,642 65,060 37,418 4.5 7.0 2.5 135.37 
Professionals 51,262 86,193 34,931 8.3 9.3 1.0 68.14 
Associate professionals & 
technicians 36,625 99,519 62,894 5.9 10.8 4.8 171.72 
Clerks 98,651 129,461 30,810 16.0 14.0 -2.0 31.23 
Service workers & shop & sales 
workers 61,578 105,644 44,066 10.0 11.4 1.4 71.56 
Craft & related trades workers 115,197 107,586 -7,611 18.7 11.6 -7.1 -6.61 
Plant & machine operators & 
assemblers 84,760 71,706 -13,054 13.8 7.8 -6.0 -15.40 
Elementary [unskilled] workers 117,603 183,717 66,114 19.1 19.9 0.8 56.22 
Undetermined & skilled 
agricultural occupations 22,932 76,058 53,126 3.7 8.2 4.5 231.67 
Total 616,250 924,944 308,694 100.0 100.0  50.09 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the South African population census results.2 
                                                 
2 The data for 1980 were calculated from the South Africa 1980 Population Census unit record data that were purchased directly from Statistics 
South Africa, Pretoria. They are now stored in the Data First Resource Centre at the University of Cape Town. The data for 2001 were calculated 
using the Census 2001 Community Profiles Database supplied by Statistics South Africa, Pretoria. The data for both 1980 and 2001 are for the 
areas covered by the Magisterial Districts listed in note 1 above. 
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R1-R400 1 1 1 2 4 4 3 11 5 
R401-R800 2 1 3 4 10 10 8 25 10 
R801-R1,600 6 5 11 18 31 34 40 44 26 
R1,601-R3,200 15 12 22 34 26 31 35 16 23 
R3,201-R6,400 25 25 34 32 17 15 10 3 19 
R6,401-R12,800 26 29 20 9 8 6 2 1 11 
R12,801-R25,600 17 18 6 1 3 1 1 0 5 
R25,601-R51,200 6 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
R51,201-R102,400 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R102,401-R204,800 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R204,801 or more 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
          
Average Income R13,337 R14,150 R7,167 R4,255 R4,403 R3,061 R2,413 R1,488 R5,412 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Census 2001 Community Profiles Database.2 This population census recorded the income 





Figure 2. Percentage monthly income by occupation, Cape Town, 2001. Source: Authors’ analysis of the 
Census 2001 Community Profiles Database.2 
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The growth of employment in these middle-income service sector occupations 
did not, therefore, contribute to income polarisation. To the contrary, 
employment growth in these occupations more than made up for the loss of 
middle-income manufacturing jobs. Over the period 1980 to 2001, for every 
craft, operative and assembling job that was lost from the manufacturing sector, 
three clerical, service, shop and sales jobs were created (Table 4). 
 
De-industrialisation in Cape Town did not, therefore, lead to an overall decline 
in middle-income jobs. If we group the middle-income service sector 
occupations of ‘clerks’ and ‘service workers and shop and market sales workers’ 
with ‘craft and related trade workers’ and ‘plant and machine operators and 
assemblers’, we see that there was an absolute employment increase of 54,211 
middle-income jobs (Table 5). So, one of the criteria for social polarisation, 
namely the absolute decline of middle-income jobs, has not been met with these 
results. However, the trend in employment growth is still marginally a polarising 
one. Although, there was over twice as much growth in high-income jobs than in 
middle-income jobs, the growth in low-income jobs exceeded the amount of 
growth in middle-income jobs by only 12 percent (Table 6) 
 
The interpretation of these results must also take into account the shape of this 
marginally polarising growth pattern, which shows much greater employment 
growth in high-income occupations than low-income occupations. If we 
compare the extent of absolute employment growth in the separate occupational 
groups of ‘managers, legislators and senior officials’, ‘professionals’, ‘associate 
professionals and technicians’ and unskilled ‘elementary workers’, the latter 
group has grown more than all the others (Table 4). However, if we group the 
high-income occupations together, then the absolute employment change in 
high-income occupations was two and a half times as much as the change in 
low-income elementary workers. Specifically, employment in the managerial, 
professional and associate professional occupations increased by 135,243, 
whereas employment of elementary workers increased by only 66,114. The 
bimodal growth pattern is therefore skewed towards the high-income 
occupations (Table 6). 
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Table 6. Changes in the occupational distribution of the working 










Managers, legislators & senior 
officials, Professionals & 





Clerks, Service workers & shop 
& sales workers; Craft & related 
trades workers, Plant & machine 




Elementary [unskilled] workers 117,603 183,717 66,114
 Undetermined and skilled 
agricultural occupations 
22,932 76,058 53,126
 Total 616,250 924,944 308,694
Source: Authors’ analysis of the South African population census results.2 
 
How do these changes in the occupational class structure of Cape Town 
compare with changes in other de-industrialising cities? It appears that there are 
at least three types of changes to the occupational structure of de-industrialising 
cities. The first entails the absolute employment growth of professional and 
managerial jobs and the absolute decline of employment in all other groups. 
Such is the case for London in which there was even a decline in the 
employment of middle-income clerks and service workers (Hamnett, 2003). The 
second entails growth in managerial and professional jobs as well as in the 
clerical, sales and personal services workers but a decline in the numbers of both 
middle-income tradesmen and plant and machine operators and drivers, on the 
one hand, and of low-income, unskilled workers, on the other. Such is the case 
for Sydney, provided that we treat clerical and sales and personal services 
workers as one middle-income group (Baum, 1997). The third type entails the 
employment growth of high-income managers and professionals and low-
income unskilled workers, on the one hand, and employment decline among 
middle-income manufacturing workers, on the other. Such is the case for Cape 
Town and Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004). Both these cities are also 
characterised by the growth in employment of middle-income clerical, sales and 
personal services workers. 
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So, de-industrialisation does have one common result in different kinds of cities: 
it invariably results in the absolute employment growth of high-income 
managerial and professional jobs and the decline of middle-income blue-collar 
manufacturing jobs. However, the fate of middle-income clerical, sales and 
personal service jobs and unskilled manual jobs varies from city to city. 
 
If the service sector is so much more polarised than the manufacturing sector, as 
the social polarisation hypothesis would suggest, then how can an increase in 
service jobs in the face of decreasing manufacturing employment not result in 
increased polarisation? We would argue that not all sub-sectors of the service 
sector are as occupationally polarised as proponents of the social polarisation 
hypothesis contend. For example, the producer services are argued to be both the 
fastest growing and most polarised of the service sub-sectors. Thus, much of the 
blame for increasing polarisation is attributed to these types of services (Sassen, 
2001: 9). However, our results show that the occupational distribution of FIRE 
is not so much polarised as skewed towards high and middle-income workers. In 
2001, 43 percent of workers in FIRE were high-income, high-skill workers, 
46 percent were middle-income workers and only 8 percent were low-income, 
low-skill workers (Table 7). Just under half of the jobs gained in FIRE from 
1980 to 2001 were in high-income, high-skill occupations (39,751 out of 82,358, 
Table 8).  By contrast, this sector gained the second lowest number of low-
income, low-skill occupations (8,340) of all four main sectors (second only to 
manufacturing, in which total employment actually declined between 1980 and 
2001). Thus, the contribution FIRE made to overall employment growth was 




Table 7. Percentage distribution of occupations by main sectors, Cape Town, 2001 
 




Managers, legislators & senior officials 
Professionals 
Associate professionals & technicians 
} High-income high-skill 20 23 43 37 
Clerks 
Service workers & shop & sales workers } Middle-income Clerical & sales 17 41 40 22 
Craft and related trades workers 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers } Middle-income Blue-collar 45 17 6 4 
Elementary [unskilled] workers  Low-income, low-skill 15 16 8 33 
Undetermined and skilled agricultural workers   3 3 3 3 
Total   100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ analysis of South African population census results.2 
 
Table 8: Change in the occupational composition of main economic sectors from 1980 to 2001, Cape Town 
 





High-income, high-skill +11,243 +21,569 +39,751 +35,974 +108,537 +8.4 
Clerical & sales +2,119 +22,514 +25,492 +10,176 +60,301 -0.6 
Blue-collar -37,826 +9,997 +5,568 -225 –22,486 -13.1 
Low-income, low-skill +7,144 +15,623 +8,340 +16,777 +47,884 +0.8 
Undetermined & agriculture +1,151 +3,738 +3,207 +5,558 +13,654 +4.5 
Total -16,169 +73,441 +82,358 +68,260 +207,890 0.0 
Source: Authors’ analysis of South African population censuses.2 
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Arguably then, cities in which most service sector growth has been in FIRE will 
have a more professionalised occupational structure than cities in which most 
growth has occurred in other service sub-sectors. For example, whereas the 
FIRE sector grew to provide 14 percent of all employment in Cape Town in 
2001 (Table 9), this same sector accounted for more than double that percentage 
of employment (32 percent) in London in 1999 (Hamnett, 2003: 35). This is the 
dominant sector in London in terms of employment. If work in the FIRE sector 
in London is as heavily skewed towards high-income, high-skill occupations as 
it was shown to be in Cape Town, then it is not surprising that London has 
become more professionalised. 
 
It could be argued that the FIRE sector in London is much larger than that in 
Cape Town simply because Cape Town shows only minimal evidence of being a 
world city. It is certainly true that Cape Town is not a global city in terms of its 
role in the world economy.  However, Hong Kong is categorised as a global 
city, and yet the relative distribution of employment across economic sectors in 
Hong Kong is almost identical to that of Cape Town (Table 9). Employment in 
the FIRE sector contributed 16 percent to all employment in Hong Kong in 2001 
(Chiu and Lui, 2004: 1868).  This is not much more than the 14 percent the 
FIRE sector contributed to total employment in Cape Town in the same year. 
Thus it could be argued that London has become more professionalised and 
Cape Town and Hong Kong have become more polarised due, at least in part, to 
the differing percentages of employment provided by the FIRE sector in these 
cities. 
 
Cape Town and Hong Kong could also be experiencing polarisation as a result 
of the growth of employment in ‘social and personal services’. The ‘social and 
personal services’ sector has a much more polarised occupational structure than 
all of the other main employment sectors in Cape Town (Table 7). Although the 
percentage of high-income, high-skill workers in ‘social and personal services’ 
was only slightly less (37 percent) than in FIRE, the percentage share of low-
income, low-skill workers was four times larger (33 percent) than in FIRE 
(8 percent) (Table 7). Because ‘social and personal services’ constitutes 
similarly large percentage of employment in Cape Town and Hong Kong (about 
26 percent in both cities), it is perhaps not surprising that these two cities are 
becoming somewhat polarised while London, where this service sub-sector 
comprises only 14 percent of all employment, is becoming more 
professionalised. 
 
This finding, namely that different service sub-sectors have different 
occupational distributions, may help explain why de-industrialising cities exhibit 
such a range of occupational and income distributions. Specifically, these results 
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suggest that cities with large FIRE sectors will, all other things being equal, tend 
to have a professionalized occupational structure. By contrast, cities with large 
‘social and personal services’ sectors will tend to have a polarised occupational 
structure.  In the case of Cape Town, the impact of de-industrialisation on the 
occupational structure can be understood in terms of the size and occupational 
composition of its service sub-sectors. 
 
Table 9: Percentage distribution of employment by main economic 
sectors in Hong Kong, Cape Town and London 
 





Community, social and personal 
services 26 29 14 
Commerce 26 20 22 
Manufacturing 12 18 8 
Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 16 15 32 
Transport, storage and 
communications 11 6 9 
Others 9 12 16 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the 2001 South African population census results, 
Chiu and Lui (2004: 1869) and Hamnett (2003: 35). 
 
Why do some de-industrialising cities have relatively more employment in the 
‘community, social and personal services’ sector than others? Since this service 
sector employs relatively more unskilled workers than others, another way of 
asking this question is to ask why some cities have more unskilled workers than 
others. Hamnett has proposed that these different occupational outcomes of de-
industrialisation may depend upon the nature of the welfare state and the scale 
and type of migration to de-industrialising cities (Hamnett, 1996). Specifically, 
he argues that post-industrial cities with polarised occupational structures, such 
as New York, are fairly exceptional because they are characterised by the large-
scale immigration of unskilled workers and the absence of welfare benefits. 
Consequently, unskilled immigrants have no choice but to accept low-wage 
service sector jobs. By contrast, post-industrial cities, such as London and 
Randstad, have no such polarised occupational structure. This is because they 
have relatively low numbers of unskilled immigrants and because the welfare 
state plays an important role in both limiting the growth of low-wage service 
sector jobs through minimum wage legislation and by providing unemployment 
benefits (Esping-Anderson, 1993; Hamnett, 1994a; 1994b; 1996, 2003). 
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In Cape Town, these conditions for the growth in employment of unskilled 
workers have certainly been met. Since 1980, most low-skilled migrants who 
have come to Cape Town were Africans from the Eastern Cape countryside. 
Although the apartheid state tried to limit African urbanisation through forced 
removals and demolitions, it was met with popular resistance that finally won 
rural Africans the right to live in the city (Cole, 1984). Thus, by the time that 
urbanisation controls were abolished in 1986, substantial numbers of rural 
Africans had already migrated to live in Cape Town (Dewar, Rosmarin and 
Watson, 1991). After the controls over African urbanisation were removed, 
migration from the Eastern Cape countryside increased (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 
1999: 15). According to the 2001 population census, about 85,000 Eastern Cape 
migrants arrived in Cape Town in the 5 years preceding the census. These low 
skilled migrants therefore comprised 25 percent of all migrants that moved to 
Cape Town over the period 1997 to 2001 (Smith, 2005). Most of these African 
migrants had very little education. A survey of the Cape Town population 
conducted in 1998 revealed that more than half of the heads of African migrant 
households were functionally illiterate (Cross, Bekker and Eva, 1999). A survey 
conducted in 2000 of the African residents of Khayelitsha, also showed that 27 
percent of adult African migrants had received less than 6 years of schooling, 53 
percent had achieved some level of high school education and only 13 percent 
had achieved a tertiary qualification.3 Not surprisingly, the employment 
prospects for these migrants were bleak. Their unemployment rate was as high 
as 45 percent.3 Of those migrants who were employed, just under half (49 
percent) held unskilled manual jobs.3 
 
These high levels of unemployment are consistent with South Africa’s relatively 
meagre unemployment benefits. Unlike social democratic countries that provide 
long-term unemployment benefits, the South African state provides only short-
term relief from unemployment. The Unemployment Insurance Fund pays a 
benefit to unemployed workers for a period of only six months (SAIRR, 2004: 
318). Furthermore, the benefit does not pay more than about R700 per month 
over this period, which is less than half the salary of an elementary worker 
(Department of Labour, 2004: 18). Choosing to drop out of the labour market 
                                                 
3 These results are based on the authors’ analysis of the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain 2000 
Survey unit record data. These data are available from the Data First Resource Centre at the 
University of Cape Town. For a discussion of the survey sample see Crankshaw et al. (2001). 
The estimation of the unemployment rate is based on the calculations performed by Nattrass 
(2005: 499-501) and refers to workers who are available to work, wish to have a job and have 
searched actively for work. The sample size of migrants for the calculation of unemployment 
was 1,169, which gives a confidence interval of 5.8 percent at a probability level of 95 percent 
(i.e. the estimate is accurate to within 2.9 percent). The estimate of the percentage of unskilled 
workers is based on a sample size of 478, which gives a confidence interval of 9 percent at a 
probability level of 95 percent. 
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and to live on welfare benefits, is therefore not an option for unemployed South 
Africans. 
 
It is therefore fairly clear that there is an oversupply of unskilled manual labour 
in Cape Town that is probably resulting in a downward pressure on unskilled 
wages.  This, in turn, may have been an important cause of the growth in 





Through this comparative study of de-industrialisation in Cape Town we have 
argued that the growth in service sector employment can have very different 
consequences for the occupational class structure of cities. Earlier studies that 
have addressed the social polarisation/professionalisation debate have generally 
made the mistake of conceptualising service sector occupational classes as either 
low-income, low-skill occupations or high-income, high-skill occupations but 
not as middle-income, semi-skilled occupations. This has meant that scholars 
have interpreted growing employment in both these high-income and low-
income service sector occupations as evidence for social polarisation. 
Alternatively, growth in only the high-income service sector occupations has 
been interpreted as evidence for professionalisation. We have presented 
evidence to show that workers in the occupational classes of ‘clerical workers’ 
and ‘service workers, shop and market sales workers’ have incomes that are 
comparable to those of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers in the 
manufacturing sector. On this basis, we have conceptualised these clerical, 
service and sales workers as middle-income service sector workers. Our 
evidence for Cape Town shows that the growth of service sector employment 
resulted, not only in the growth of high-income, managerial and professional 
jobs, on the one hand, and low-income, unskilled jobs on the other, but also in 
the growth of employment in these middle-income service sector jobs. So, 
although it is true that employment growth was greater at the poles of the 
occupational distribution, the growth of low-income jobs was only marginally 
greater than the growth in middle-income jobs. This study therefore suggests 
that some studies may have overestimated the polarising effects of service sector 
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